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J. Ladyman (1998-2009), Ladyman and Ross (2007) refine J. Worral's (1998) structural 
realism (SR), by developing an ontic structural realism (OSR) which they argue is a consistently 
naturalistic means of characterizing the ontology of fundamental physics. I argue that elements 
of analytic metaphysics strengthen and refine their project of characterizing fundamental physics 
via OSR and by extension, their presentation of information-theoretic structural realism (ITSR). I 
refine this point by situating M. Lange’s (2009) discussion of nomological modality qua natural 
necessity within Ladyman and Ross’s discussion of ITSR. The logical hierarchy evinced in 
Lange’s (2009) ‘nomic stability’ further extends and refines Ladyman and Ross’s claims through 
the addition of nuanced  modal distinctions in a systematic framework. 
 
1. Wherefore ‘Ontic’ in Ontic Structural Realism (OSR)? 
 ‘Structural realism’ (SR) was explicitly coined by John Worrall (1989), in an attempt to 
develop a plausible rendition of scientific realism immune to the ‘inflationary metaphysics’ to 
which typical versions are often vulnerable.1  Eo ipso, SR’s aim would also avoid the ‘indexical 
anthropocentrism’ some might see as problematic with scientific non-realism.2 ‘Roughly 
speaking, structural realism is the view that our best scientific theories describe the structure of 
reality, where [contra non-realism] is more than saving the phenomena, but [contra scientific 
realism] less than providing a true description of the natures of the [putative] unobservable 
entities that cause the phenomena.’ (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 67) 
Moreover, it bears emphasizing that SR was developed in response to the problem of theory-
change or (in some cases) radical conceptual change, by far the most difficult problem 
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confronting the scientific realist. ‘Theories can be very different and yet share all kinds of 
structure…Hence, a form of realism that is committed only to the structure of theories might not 
be undermined by theory change…The most minimal form of [SR]…is best thought of as a 
defence of the cumulative nature of science in the face of Kuhnian worries about revolutions.’ 
(Ladyman 2009, 6)  Indeed elements of structural realism are present, at least in implicit form, in 
much Western philosophical, mathematical, and scientific literature dating as far back as 
Aristotle.3 
1.1  What is Wrong with ESR  
J. Ladyman (beginning in 1998) distinguishes epistemic from ontic structural realism (ESR 
versus OSR), arguing that both notions are often mistakenly conflated in Worrall. I will make 
passing mention to ESR, briefly summarizing (according to Demopoulos and Friedman’s 1985) 
critiques) why the position is oft considered untenable.   According to ESR, all one can ever 
fundamentally know about the physical world reduces to the level of structure—whether (weakly 
construed) that comprises au fond (unknowable) individuals’ intrinsic properties, or (strongly) 
only the second-order relational structure of otherwise unknowable individuals and their 
properties. For example, (Carnap 1929 and Russell 1911 held fast to the latter notion—as evident 
in Russell’s logicist metaphysical thesis: ‘[S]cience only tells us about purely logical features of 
the world …[since] we know only the (second-order) isomorphism class of the structure of the 
world and not the (first order) structure itself.’ (Ladyman 2009, 7).  
 Demopoulos & Friedman’s (1985 criticisms of ESR can be viewed as following in spirit 
Newman’s (1928) objection to Russell (1911),4 and to a closer logical letter.  According to the 
syntactic view, a theory Π may be regimented into some first-order formal syntax (FOL) such 
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that: ( )nm tttooo ,...,,;,...,, 2121Π  where Π is the theory’s sentence in the FOL, and o1,…,om are the 
observation terms and t1,…,tn are the theoretical terms in Π.5  As Ramsey (1929) originally 
showed, one can formulate Π in this FOL by quantifying over its theoretical terms by way of 
constructing its Ramsey Sentence R: 
( ) ( )nmnionRamsificatnm xxxoooRxxxtttooo ,...,,;,...,,...,...,,;,...,, 212121''2121 ∃∃∃ →←Π  
What is important to keep in mind is that the above procedure does not eliminate the 
(unobservable) theoretical ‘vocabulary’: ‘[T]he Ramsey sentence only asserts that there are some 
objects, properties, and relations that have certain logical features, satisfying certain implicit 
definitions…it is a mistake to think that the Ramsey sentence allows us to eliminate theoretical 
entities…It is just that they are referred to not directly, by means of theoretical terms, but by 
description…via variables, connectives, quantifiers and predicate terms whose direct referents 
are (allegedly) known by acquaintance.’ (Ladyman 2009, 8).  Hence one can think of the Ramsey 
procedure as the logical machinery underwriting ESR—Russell certainly did. 
As Demopolous and Friedman (1985) further clarify: If Π is logically consistent (in the FOL) 
and all its observational consequences are true, then the truth of its Ramsey sentence R follows as 
a theorem of set theory or second-order logic (so long as the initial domain of referents is 
characterized by a set of the proper cardinality). In other words, the formal structure cannot 
single out a unique referent, so ‘only cardinality questions are open to [empirical] discovery, 
everything else will be known a priori.’ (9) If only the cardinality of the set of observation-terms 
can be fixed a posteriori, then all theories with the same set of observational consequences will 
be equally true.  Hence (a’ la Neumann’s objection) ‘Russell’s realism collapses into a version of 
phenomenalism or strict empiricism.’ (Demopoulos and Friedman 1985,  635).   
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In accords with the semantic view, ‘the Ramsey sentence of a theory and the theory itself are 
importantly different.’ (Ladyman 2009, 10)  At best Ramsey sentences pick out entities in such a 
manner that the referents of theoretical terms become functions of the place such terms hold in 
the theory’s logical structure, ‘so simply adopting Ramsification may actually make the problem 
of ontological discontinuity even more acute.’ (10). Hence, ‘structural realism should be thought 
of as metaphysically, rather than merely epistemically revisionary.’ (ibid., emphases added). 
1.2 The Alternative: OSR  
A position that ‘most physicists advocate’ (whether implicitly or otherwise), OSR’s claim is 
that the physical world is ultimately individuated by some species of structure: ‘Ontic structural 
realists argue that what we have learned from contemporary physics is that the nature of space, 
time and matter are not compatible with standard metaphysical views about the ontological 
relationship between individuals, intrinsic properties and relations…broadly construed OSR is 
any form of structural realism based on an ontological or metaphysical thesis that inflates the 
ontological priority of structure and relations.’ (Ladyman 2009, 11)  
Ladyman (2009, 11-21) subdivides OSR into a total of seven different positions, of varying 
degrees of metaphysical strength or tendentiousness, as summarized below.6  
OSR-1: There are no individuals, there is only relational structure.  For example, certainly 
universals (a’ la Platonism) ‘presuppose formal properties that are independent of the 
contingencies of [their] instantiation…To say that all there is are relations and no relata, is 
perhaps to follow Plato [further] and say that the world of appearances is not properly 
thought of as part of the content of knowledge.’ (11).   
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OSR-2: There are relational facts and relations that do not supervene on the intrinsic 
spatiotemporal properties of relata. Although this runs counter to a ‘deeply entrenched way 
of thinking’—since structure of often characterized set theoretically or logically (upon which 
all relational structure therefore trivially supervenes)---’[A]dvocates of OSR[-2]…emphasize 
the non-supervenient relations implied by quantum entanglements undermine the ontological 
priority conferred on individuals in most traditional metaphysics.’ (13).   
OSR-3: Individual objects have no intrinsic natures. An example of this position is described 
by Parsons (2008) as an example of ‘eliminative structuralism’ in the case of mathematical 
objects. To say, for example, that numbers have no ‘intrinsic nature’ is to claim that numbers 
reduce entirely to ‘external’ partial ordering relations characterized in terms of some abstract 
structure, determined recursively by the Peano axioms, etc.7   
OSR-4: There are individual entities, but they have no irreducibly intrinsic properties 
denoted as a ‘moderate OSR,’ in which ‘all the properties of individual objects are 
ontologically dependent on the relational structures.’8   
OSR-5: Facts about identity and diversity of objects are ontologically dependent on the 
relational structures, of which they are a part. Ladyman (2008, 2009) refers to this position 
by arguing that there are cases (in quantum spin statistics—e.g. Bosons versus Fermions) in 
which the identity and diversity of the objects in a structure (the statistical ensemble, in this 
case) is a primitive feature of the structure as a whole: Fermions are individuated via the 
Pauli Exclusion Principle, whereas Bosons are not.   
OSR-6: There are no subsistent objects, only relational structure is ontologically subsistent.9  
OSR-7: Individual objects are epistemic constructs.10 
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All seven different versions of OSR incorporate the ramifications of some of the most 
successful physical theories- quantum field theory (QFT), General and Special Relativity (GR 
and SR), quantum chromodynamics (QCD), quantum topology, etc., as suggesting 
metaphysically a view of the world which calls into question the ‘traditional’ metaphysical 
world-picture. (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 1-129) expand upon this point by attacking 
contemporary analytic metaphysics.11  To this extent, one can view OSR as calling attention to a 
central problem involving the individuation of objects, by the metaphysical lights of some of our 
best theories in physics: 
There is no unanimity about the difference between individuals, objects, and entities 
among philosophers but one neutral way of putting the issue is to ask whether there are 
only individual objects in the logical sense…as the value of a first-order variable, or 
whether there are individuals in some more substantive sense (for example, being subject 
to laws of identity, or being substances).  (Ladyman 2009,  12)   
Ladyman and Ross (2007, 130-258) deny the above question.  In their chapter on  
fundamental physics, a host of positions are surveyed12, through the primarily operative category 
of information (whether conceived classically—e.g., Shannon-Weaver, or quantum 
mechanically—e.g., von Neumann).  In particular: 
Information is apt for characterizing QM [quantum mechanics] because it is a modal 
concept…The world is not made of anything [understand in the classically metaphysical 
substantival sense of a primitive atomistic ontology] and information is a fundamental 
concept for understanding the objective modality of the world, for example, laws, 
causation, and kinds. (Ladyman and Ross 2007,  188-189) 
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Indeed, objective modality is what evinces OSR to be a rendition of scientific realism13—minus 
the ontological commitments of standard versions of scientific realism, i.e. insofar as the latter 
assent to the truth-conditions characterizing the semantic reference of the (unobservable) content 
of a theory’s central terms.14  
2. Information and OSR   
The metaphysical burden of developing an account of individuals, causation, and laws 
qua the special sciences from the OSR framework characterizing fundamental physics is taken 
up by Ladyman and Ross (2007, 190-297). ‘If fundamental relationships in physics are described 
by symmetric mathematical relations…the same surely cannot be said of the most important 
generalizations in biology or economics.  Even if quantum entanglement is thought to undermine 
individualism in fundamental physics, it is generally thought not to ‘percolate upwards’ into the 
domains of the special sciences.’ (196) By the lights of OSR: 
[T]o present the ontology of the world according to, for example, GR [general relativity] 
one would present the apparatus of differential geometry and the field equations and then 
go on to explain the topology and other characteristics of the particular model…that is 
thought to describe the actual world.  There is nothing else to be said…Mathematical 
structures are used for the representation of physical structure and relations, and this kind 
of representation is ineliminable and irreducible in science…This may suggest a kind of 
Pythagoreanism, asserting the identity of structures in mathematics and physics and 
abandoning the distinction between the abstract structures employed in models and the 
concrete that are the objects of physics.  [It is thought that] [t]he canonical substance in 
physics is matter, but matter has become increasingly ephemeral in modern 
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physics…Moreover, the dependence of physics on ideal entities (such as point masses 
and frictionless planes) and models also offers another argument against attaching any 
significance to the abstract/concrete distinction. (159-160) 
Information is viewed as the operative category here, in terms of collapsing the epistemic 
distinction of abstract versus concrete and the ontological distinction of substance versus form.  
In particular, as suggested in the passage above on objective modality, the authors argue for an 
‘information theoretic fundamentalism,’ which (echoing Zeilinger) in a deflationary sense 
renders impossible any operational distinction to be made between reality and information. (189)  
2.1 Two Central Principles: Naturalistic Closure (PNC) and Primacy of Physics 
(PPC) 
 
 To safeguard this information-theoretic fundamentalism from reducing to the thesis that 
the world is constituted by some new substance, (i.e., ‘infostuff’, suggestive of the traditional 
metaphysical enterprise of characterizing the world in some kind of a compositional hierarchy15) 
two central methodological principles secure the project as a naturalistic endeavor: 
Principle of Naturalistic Closure (PNC): A metaphysical claim to be taken seriously at 
time t –i.e., if the claim is accepted as true at time t—should only be motivated by 
showing how two (or more) fundamental hypotheses (at least one such hypothesis drawn 
from fundamental physics) can jointly explain more than the sum of what the hypotheses 
can explain, when taken separately.16  
Primacy of Physics Constraint (PPC): Hypotheses in special sciences that conflict with 
the consensus in fundamental physics ‘should be rejected for that reason alone.  
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Fundamental physical hypotheses are not symmetrically hostage to the conclusions of the 
special sciences.’ (Ladyman and Ross, 2007,  44)  
The PNC and the PPC act as constitutive and regulative principles for a metaphysics 
naturalized, i.e. a discipline in which ‘networks of consilience’ (Whewell) are established across 
the specialized sciences, constrained appropriately by the PPC.  Adopting the PNC and PPC 
suggests a Peircean verificationism,17 in which methodologically one cannot draw any principled 
distinction between fundamental physics and metaphysics. (45, n.45) Naturalistic 
metaphysicians’ claims differ only in a manner of degree with those of scientists, since (meta-
methodologically speaking) there is no monolithic ‘scientific method’ simpliciter. (28)  Instead, 
‘specific institutional processes [insofar as they’re delimited by the PPC] of science have 
inductively established peculiar epistemic reliability.’ (37) In short, their metaphysic synthesizes 
elements of constructive empiricism and a scientific realism based on ‘broadly Peircean 
verificationism.’ (67)  
Naturalistic metaphysics, then, utilizing the PNC and PPC underwrites OSR as a species 
of information-theoretic (not ‘infostuff’) fundamentalism: ‘[A] practicing physicist entertains the 
idea of modal structure ungrounded in substances and natures of fundamental entities is…PNC-
compatible evidence that OSR should be taken seriously despite its incompatibility with the 
intuitions fostered in philosophers by the combination of parochial demands placed on our 
cognition…and an education in the classical texts of metaphysical tradition.’ (188)  
3.  A Role for Analytic Metaphysics to Play in OSR  
Predictably, Ladyman and Ross (2007) did not escape the notice of some contemporary 
analytic metaphysicians. In particular, Cian Dorr (2010) comments: 
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In rejecting the modes of argument they see as characteristic of analytic metaphysics, the 
authors…have, I fear, also cut themselves off from the techniques analytic metaphysics 
has developed for stating claims clear and explicit enough to be worthy targets of 
argument…This is a great pity, from the point of view of anyone who shares the authors’ 
belief that analytic metaphysics has much to learn form a more informed engagement 
with modern physics and philosophy of physics. ( 8) 
Hawley (2010) phrases her criticisms more charitably: 
[T]hough the details are new, they fit into a venerable tradition of anti-metaphysical 
thought stretching back through the logical positivists to Hume…it is striking that this 
challenge is not the methodological issue which most preoccupies metaphysicians right 
now. (1)…[T]he literature of contemporary analytic metaphysics contains a wealth of 
resources, distinctions and concepts which the authors might profitably have used in 
developing and setting out…their views, even if just by way of contrast.  After all, one 
standard, very modest view of the role of philosophy with respect to science is that of 
conceptual clarification. (5, italics added)  
 While Dorr (2010) appears to repudiate the work on the grounds of its contents, Hawley’s 
(2010) approach focuses more on the form and methods the authors employ.  I ascribe to 
Hawley’s worry and develop a constructive case involving information qua modality to extend 
her points. Prior to this, however, one may respond to Dorr’s complaint as a being non-starter.  
Dorr’s standards of clarity and explicitness, one may gather, are somewhat discipline-specific, 
and to that effect, tendentious.  However, Ladyman and Ross (2007) already remark at the outset: 
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There is a rich tradition of naturalistic metaphysics in Western philosophy. Competing 
strongly…is a tradition which aims at domesticating scientific discoveries so as to render 
them compatible with intuitive…pictures of structural composition…Such domestication 
is typically presented as providing ‘understanding’, [a] usage…given [an] everyday 
sense…[of] ‘rendering more familiar’.  However, we are interested here in a sense of 
‘understanding’…better characterized by the term ‘explanation’…[In contrast] a given 
metaphysic’s achievement of domestication furnishes no evidence at all that the 
metaphysics in question is true, and thus no reason for believing that it explains anything. 
(1-2) 
To slightly re-phrase the above point: ‘[I]maginability must not be made the test for ontology.  
The realist claim is that the scientist is discovering the structures of the world; it is not required 
in addition that these structures be imaginable in the categories of the macroworld.’ (McMullin, 
1984,  14). 
3.1 Information and Modality 
 As briefly mentioned in the first section, OSR’s commitment is toward objective 
modality. Ladyman and Ross (2007) recognize the latter’s connection with information-theoretic 
fundamentalism: ‘Information-processing, like information, is modal.’ ( 189, n.189)  Moreover, 
their naturalism, as directed by the PPC and PNC, recognizes only nomological modality: 
For ‘modal’ read ‘nomological’ if you like.  We do not take it to be ‘causal structure’ 
[as]…causal structure is the pragmatically essential proxy for it in the special sciences 
(but not fundamental physics). (130) 
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[W]e are motivated [by]…the PNC to take seriously the world is structure and relations.  
Individual things are locally focused abstractions from modal structure. By modal 
structure we mean the relationships among phenomena (tracked or located…as things, 
properties, events, and processes) that pertain to necessity, possibility, potentiality, and 
probability. (153-4). 
Echoing Hawley’s (2010) appeal to the repertoire of ‘resources, distinctions, and concepts’ 
includes, I submit, a more fine-grained articulation of modality, as often encountered in analytic 
metaphysics.18  For instance, one may consider metaphysical modality as logical modality 
(which Kripke (1980) argued are coextensive), and epistemic modality.19 Do the latter bear any 
relevance to OSR as conceived naturalistically? 
 Ladyman and Ross (2007) state ‘there are no entities in the material mode…merely the 
world and its real patterns [and]…we will use informational concepts to define these real 
patterns.’  (186)  They refine Dennett’s (1991) latter notion20 to develop a consistent notion of 
scale-relative ontology such that a plausibly unified picture (modulo the constraints of the PPC) 
can support a principled distinction between fundamental physics and the special sciences.21 ‘A 
‘real’ pattern, Dennett (1991) argues, must admit of capture using a smaller number of bits of 
information than the bit-map transcription of the data from which the pattern could be 
computed.’ (202)  Now, as the authors admit, ‘the central concept in our theory of ontology, 
‘information’, has multiple scientific interpretations (and goodness knows how many 
philosophical ones).’ (210)  Nevertheless, to account for a theory of ontology, ‘that is, a theory 
which makes explicit the metaphysical claim made by saying of some x, in a context where 
metaphysics governs the intended contrast class, ‘x exists’’ the sense of information as logical 
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depth or algorithmic compressibility is the appropriate property of  ‘structural models of real 
patterns.’ (220) 
This notion of information qua logical depth constitutes their theory of an objective 
measurement in the abstract, which is adopted in their ‘rainforest realism’ (220-238) or 
‘information-theoretic structural realism’ (ITSR, 238-257)—the latter being the extension of the 
domain of OSR to account for the special sciences.  This general and abstract notion of 
information content necessarily comprises part of OSR’s characterization ‘of the modal structure 
of the world as manifest in regularities [and]…why regularities are the basis for something fit to 
be called modal structure.’ (221)  Nevertheless, information as thermodynamic depth (i.e. the 
minimum quantity of entropy produced for the evolution of a state) is likewise reserved ‘in 
discussion of special [e.g. biological] systems,’ since ‘[s]ketching possible empirical 
relationships between…these two ideas [logical depth, thermodynamic depth] is how we respect 
the PPC.’ (218) Moreover, in the context of fundamental physics, quantum information with its 
associated ambiguities of theoretical status22 nevertheless occupies a central position in OSR 
‘because it is a modal concept.’ (188) 
Do all the above notions of information reduce to nomological modality? I maintain that 
they do not.  Information as logical depth connotes a notion of logical modality: Recall that the 
distinction between fundamental physics and the special sciences is based a priori on the notion 
of scale and location-independent measurements made by the former and not by the latter: 
‘[T]here are some real patterns about which measurements taken anywhere in spacetime at any 
scale of measurement carry information (in the logical, not thermodynamic, sense). Fundamental 
physics is that part of institutional science responsible for trying to discover maximally 
redundant real patterns.’ (251) Information as thermodynamic depth applied to ‘special systems’ 
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connotes a notion of nomological modality—vis-à-vis the laws of the particular special science 
in question whose ontology such systems comprise. Whereas quantum information (depending 
on the particular interpretation-e.g. n. 22 above) may connote logical modality (Duwell 2003), or 
nomological modality (Bub 2004), or even epistemic modality (Fuchs and Peres 2000).  
I am in accord with Hawley’s (2010) criticisms: Ladyman and Ross (2007) exhibit an 
excessive confidence in their PNC and PPC as suitable for the task of articulating an OSR in the 
spirit of naturalism. In turn, they dismiss prematurely some of the tools available in analytical 
metaphysics, which they would do well to avail themselves in a manner which would only 
complement and strengthen their substantial claims. I suggest as well in closing that some of 
Ladyman and Ross’s nuanced ontological claims referring to the special sciences lend 
themselves to further scrutiny in the analytic enterprise of meta-ontology, specifically in its 
notion of quasi-possible objects:  ‘For any kind of quasi-possible object, Fs, it holds that it if Fs 
are quasi-possible, there is some language/framework L where ‘Fs exist’ are true.’ (Eklund 2006,  
325)  In this case, the framework L is the particular special science in question, with its objects 
Fs bound by L’s scale-relative ontology. If I am right, this would suggest an even more nuanced 
analysis of nomological modality, indexed by frameworks qua special sciences. 
 
4. Marc Lange’s Natural Necessity 
To further refine my above claims by way of a constructive case, I turn to M. Lange (2009).  
Lange’s analysis is squarely situated in the tradition of analytic philosophy of science and 
metaphysics, nevertheless devoid of the ‘neo-scholastic’ constitutive ontological assumptions 
that Ladyman and Ross (2007) cite from some sources as evidence for dismissing much of 
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contemporary analytic metaphysics tout court.23  In essence, Lange utilizes the tools of analytic 
metaphysics precisely in that fashion, i.e. as playing a regulative role, and his overall naturalistic 
stance24 remains steadfastly apparent (2009, 55, italics added): 
[I]f we take seriously the possibility that our intuitions have been corrupted by our 
philosophy, then we must step back, reconsider our conclusions, and seek reflective 
equilibrium.  Naturally I have tried to craft an account of law that saves the phenomena I 
find most central to scientific practice.   
A natural concordance the above passage shares with Ladyman and Ross (2007) is evident 
already in their opening claims concerning their methodology of explanation as understanding as 
cited above (p 10-11).25  To add: ‘Roughly speaking, structural realism is the view that our best 
scientific theories describe the structure of reality, where [contra non-realism, this] is more than 
saving the phenomena, but [contra scientific realism] less than providing a true description of the 
natures of the [putative] unobservable entities that cause the phenomena.’ (Ladyman and Ross 
2007,  67). 
 Prior to my further discussion of this rapprochement with Ladyman and Lange, a key 
semantic distinction needs some clarification concerning how their respective metaphysical 
claims get interpreted: viz. as de re or as de dicto.26  Whereas the entire treatment of nomological 
modality in Ladyman and Ross (2007) accords to a de re treatment—insofar as fundamental 
structural features of the world are cashed out via ‘real patterns’ (Dennett 1991) modified 
according to machinery of information theory, Lange adopts the opposite approach: Since laws 
are a species of subjunctive facts27, the interpretation is through and through de dicto: 
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I am concerned only with the modality of facts—that is, with de dicto modality, not with 
de re modality.  Moreover, I am concerned only with modalities where all necessities are 
truths, i.e. where nothing impossible happens. I thereby set aside doxastic…deontic, and 
teleological modalities, since (for example) that all persons are legally obligated to obey 
the nation’s laws does not entail that all do. (Lange 2009, n. 5, 207-208). 
For reasons I will argue below, this type mismatch presents no serious obstacle, as Ladyman and 
Ross’s de re claims concerning objective modal structure naturally evince ‘one level up’ a de 
dicto propositional structure by and through which Lange’s account of natural laws can logically 
supervene.28  
 For instance, in their discussion on the foundations of quantum mechanics Ladyman and 
Ross (2007) mention that: 
[E]ven van Fraassen concedes that Bell’s theorem reveals something about the modal 
structure of the world [insofar as]…some correlations [violating the Bell inequalities] 
between physical systems are brute and not explicable in terms of either a direct causal 
link or a common cause…we claim that the acceptance of such brute 
correlations…entails a metaphysical commitment to the objective modal structure of the 
world, because the correlations in question are probabilistic and hence modal and not 
merely occurrent. (2007, 186-187, italics added) 
The italicized portion in the above signals the de re interpretation of the ‘objective [nomological] 
structure of the world,’ indeed a hallmark distinguishing feature of OSR.  Without such an 
objectively modal base, any robust or meaningfully objective de dicto reading of the ‘world’s 
subjunctive facts’ (the lawmakers for Lange29) would resemble a castle built in the air: Hence the 
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de dicto propositional structure of the world’s subjunctive facts naturally supervenes on the 
‘world’s objective [read: de re] modality’ of OSR—thus the projects complement one another, 
rather than being incommensurate. 
4.1 Nomic Preservation and Sub-Nomic Stability 
 To distinguish laws from accidents vis-à-vis sets of counterfactuals, Lange introduces the 
following two principles: 
Nomic Preservation (NP): For any subnomic30 fact m: m is a law if and only if in any 
context31, p → m for any p that is logically consistent with all the n’s taken together, where 
it is a law that n.  (2009, 25) 
To avoid problems in triviality, circularity, and arbitrariness (to be discussed below) the above 
NP filtering condition is supplemented with sub-nomic stability. 
Sub-Nomic Stability (SNS): Any nonempty set Γ (deductively closed) is subnomically 
stable if and only if for each m ∈ Γ:  ~ (p ◊→ ~m),  ~ (q ◊→ (p ◊→ ~m)),                                        
~ (r ◊→ (q ◊→ (p ◊→ ~m))),  …. for all p, q, r…. such that Γ∪{p} is logically consistent, 
Γ∪{q} is logically consistent, Γ∪{r} is logically consistent, …  (2009, 29) 
Analogous to the PPC and PNC (Primacy of Physics Constraint, Principle of Naturalistic 
Closure) acting as regulative and constitutive principles for a naturalized metaphysics (as I 
mention in pp. 8-9 above) likewise can the NP and SNS be so understood as regulative and 
constitutive principles distinguishing laws from accidents. 
 That NP is a reliable regulative filter has to with the fact that it ‘accord[s] well with our 
routine scientific practice of using the natural laws to ascertain what would have happened under 
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various hypothetical circumstances.’ (Lange 2009,  25) Using the natural laws to ascertain what 
would have happened is taken care of the consistency condition ‘with all the (subnomic facts n)32 
taken together, such that ‘it is a law that n.’  For example33, consider the claim p: ‘The Earth (like 
Uranus) is tilted on its axis by an additional 90o,’ (i.e. the polar axis lies on its present equatorial 
plane.)  Neglecting causal conditions perturbing the Earth’s orbit to evince such a pole shift, 
certainly p is logically consistent with all the known laws n of classical mechanics.34  Moreover, 
all the laws of classical mechanics fix the context of relevance, as counterfactual conditionals are 
notoriously context-sensitive.35 Now consider m1: ‘The Earth has seasons,’ versus m2: ‘Angular 
momentum is conserved.’  Clearly  p → m1 is false36 while p → m2 holds: i.e., the former is an 
accident, the latter is not. 
 However, as it stands NP is simultaneously too weak as well as too strong.  The 
impredicative element of NP (i.e. the fact that lawhood is tested by invoking all laws modulo 
some context of relevance) presents a circularity issue: For instance, m2 is clearly a law in the 
context of classical mechanics.37  Triviality is also apparent insofar as the range of p belong to 
sets which (by definition) are consistent with the first-order laws (i.e. the laws governing 
subnomic facts), which in the case of an accident m, this range would include ~m, but in the case 
of m being a law, it would not.38  Lawhood seems to be obtained on the cheap, which ‘amount[s] 
to the laws stacking the deck in favor of themselves.’ (2009, 26)  Moreover, circularity and 
triviality suggest arbitrariness as well, as a result of this impredicativity: ‘The concept of natural 
law appears in NP on both sides of the ‘if and only if’;…NP can portray the laws as special, in 
virtue of their invariance under this range of counterfactual suppositions, only if this particular 
range of counterfactual suppositions is itself special already.’ (27)  
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 The SNS condition hence acts as a constitutive means of distinguishing lawhood to 
compensate for the above weaknesses of NP—in spite of its virtue of representing the sorts of 
counterfactual reasoning typically engaged in scientific practice (whether in the case of the 
scientists’ formulating thought experiments or otherwise).  ‘Roughly speaking, a set of sub-
nomic truths is ‘subnomically stable’ if and only if whatever the conversational context, the set’s 
members would all still have held under every subnomic counterfactual that is logically 
consistent with the set—even under however many such suppositions are nested.’ (29)  I.e., 
recall (from NP) the condition of lawhood p → m for p consistent with all first order laws n.  
Subnomic stability should hold under recursive embedding: q → (p → m ), r → ( q → (p 
→ m ))), for p, q, r, … consistent with all first-order laws.39 
 From SNS, the set of first-order laws (laws governing sub-nomic facts) is trivially stable, 
which Lange labels this ‘base’ set as Λ.  Moreover, (details omitted here40) no subnomically 
stable set containing (at least one) accident is sub-nomically stable: Its range swells under 
recursively nested counterfactuals to eventually contain all subnomic truths.  Hence ‘except 
perhaps the set of all subnomic truths.’ (30)  Thus Λ is the largest non-maximal set that is sub-
nomically stable: 
[O]ur focus is on the proposal that laws differ from accidents in belonging to a sub-
nomically stable set that does not contain every sub-nomic truth…Sub-nomic stability 
does not start by giving special privileges to laws.  It is very egalitarian; it does not grant 
the laws the right to dictate to every set the range of counterfactual suppositions under 
which that set’s invariance is to be tested. Stability thus has the potential to be a 
genuinely special feature of the laws. (30, italics added). 
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It is for this and other reasons offered by Lange that I refer to SNS as constitutive of lawhood.41 
In a relatively simple proof by reductio (details omitted here42), Lange demonstrates further that 
subnonically stable sets form a natural hierarchy of inclusion, i.e. for any two sub-nomically 
stable sets Σ and Γ, such that t ∈ Σ and t ∉ Γ and s ∈ Γ and s ∉ Σ, then Γ ⊆ Σ or Σ ⊆ Γ. 
 As an example of such a hierarchy of sub-nomically stable sets whose base consists of all 
the subnomic truths, ‘there are…’strata’ or ‘levels’ of natural law...metaphysical account[s] of 
what natural laws are should leave room for laws to come in multiple strata.’ (41)  In particular 
the first level above all subnomic truths would (Level-1) Λ, followed by the more-restrictive 
(Level-2) set of meta-laws Λ(2) (recall n. 37 above) consisting of, for example, in the context of 
relevance determined by physics, ‘law(s) of the composition of forces, coordinate 
transformations, conservation laws…but not the force laws of the laws giving the physical 
characteristics of various kinds of particles.’ (ibid.)  The latter are, after all, first-order laws.  
Higher-level instances (e.g. n ≥ 3) would consist of the set Λ(n) containing all ‘broadly logical 
truths’43 which are sub-nomic truths.  Moreover, note that as evidenced by their logical strength 
(robustness under ranges of counterfactuals) and as rigorously proved in the general case of sub-
nomically stable sets: Λ(3) ⊂ Λ(2) ⊂ Λ ⊂ {subnomic truths}.44 
4.2 The Varieties of Natural Necessity 
 From the previous construction involving NP and SNS, Lange (2009), p 45-89) 
establishes a natural bijection with a hierarchy of nomological modalities of varying strengths, 
i.e. a hierarchy of natural necessity.  For instance, the dual to NP is Lange’s Modality Principle 
(MP): 
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Modality Principle (MP): In any context, the subnomic fact q is necessary if and only if 
~( p ◊→ ~q) for any p that is logically consistent with all the n’s taken together, such that 
n (it is necessary that n).  (74) 
Dual to the SNS, MP can be extended to include nested counterfactuals in any context, provided 
‘the variety of necessity is genuine.’ (74)  (Note that ‘genuine necessity’ is distinguished from 
‘relative necessities,’ insofar as the latter can arise in ordinary conversational contexts in which 
the necessity is bound by the conversationally relevant facts.45)  Hence the isomorphism is 
demonstrated: 
We have, at last, arrived at [the]…main thesis: for each variety of genuine necessity, the 
sub-nomic truths possessing it form a subnomically stable set—and for each sub-
nomically stable set (except the set of all sub-nomic truths, if it be stable), there is a 
variety of genuine necessity where the sub-nomic truths so necessary are exactly the set’s 
members.  In short, for the sub-nomic truths, there is a correspondence between the 
varieties of genuine necessity and the non-maximal sets possessing sub-nomic stability. 
(2009, 75, italics added) 
Thus SNS along with MP evinces a natural hierarchy of necessity, or a systematic means of 
organizing modality in such a manner that extends and systematizes the claims of Ladyman and 
Ross’s (2007) ITSR (information-theoretic structural realism) qua the ‘rainforest realism’ (RR) 
by which they derive their modal claims in the case of the special sciences.  Adopting such tools 
from analytic metaphysics is not a mere exercise in window-dressing, but as I shall show in the 
final section, the machinery introduced by Lange goes a long way to ‘clear the underbrush’ in 
22 
 
this ‘rainforest’ by evincing a natural hierarchy of species of modality, faithful to scientific 
practice and to naturalistic metaphysics at large. 
5. Conclusion: Implications for ITSR and Rainforest Realism—Clearing Some 
Underbrush 
 
As discussed briefly in Section 3. above, information qua ‘real patterns’ (Dennett 1991) in its 
multiple senses (e.g. logical, thermodynamic, and ‘quantum’46) constitutes Ladyman and Ross’s 
(2007) OSR, by shouldering the primary metaphysical burden for characterizing PPC and PNC-
compatible ontologies utilized by fundamental physics or by the special sciences:  
That there is such a distinction between real patterns and mere patterns (OSR), and how it is 
to be drawn…and that nothing else about existence in general should be said (PNC), is the 
content of the metaphysical theory defended in this book…The main ontological implication 
of OSR is that reality is not a sum of concrete particulars.  Rather, individual objects, events, 
and properties are devices used by observers…to keep cognitive books on what science finds 
to be sufficiently stable to be worth measuring over time, viz. some but not other 
patterns…What OSR denies is that real patterns resolve ‘at bottom’ into self-subsistent 
individuals…we must put the ‘at bottom’ inside scare-quotes, because we find the levels 
metaphor misleading.  The single most important idea we are promoting in this book is that 
to take the conventional philosophical model of an individual as being equivalent to the 
model of an existent mistakes practical convenience for metaphysical generalization. 
(Ladyman and Ross 2007, 228-9) 
In their particular sections (4.4-4.5 2007, 220-238) the above metaphysical insight is backed up 
by a thoroughly technical exposition concerning how (scale relative) ontologies can emerge, viz. 
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‘real patterns worth measuring over time’ in such a mode and manner as to become individuated 
in terms of objects, events, properties, processes—ontological distinctions having au fond 
‘practical convenience’ relative to a particular science (whether fundamental physics or special), 
but no ‘fundamental’ metaphysical import.  I omit from my discussion the technical details 
here—save for mentioning in passing that a necessarily operative methodological notion rests on 
projectibility47—which is how the authors justify ‘ontological implication of their [viz. such 
“devices used by observers”] without commitment to general reductionism or even 
supervenience.’ (2007, 223).  
 One may ask, however, given the above considerations in section 4. above: is the 
‘rainforest’ really that ‘dense’?  More to the point, accepting the underlying metaphysical claims 
being made here, i.e. that there is a means to consistently (within the constraints of PNC and 
PPC) ‘locate’ a species of ‘vegetation’ (analogous to a particular ontological domain in question 
for a particular science) by virtue of such information-theoretic considerations discussed in this 
section; nevertheless, as I indicated elsewhere, borrowing selectively certain tools and concepts 
from analytic philosophy may go a long way to refine and render more nuanced certain 
important modal distinctions that, as I have argued in the previous sections above, Ladyman and 
Ross (2007) have glossed over.  In particular, what I suggest here in this concluding passage is a 
means to “cultivate” this rainforest using Lange’s (2009) hierarchy of nomic necessity. Ladyman 
and Ross proclaim that nomological modality is given by fundamental physics, and that is the 
only genus of modality suitable for a metaphysics naturalized:    
From the point of view of those engaged in special science activity, fundamental physics 
gives the modal structure of the world. For philosophers who insist that talk of ‘higher 
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and lower orders of necessity just makes a nonsense of the idea of necessity altogether, 
the italicized claim operationalizes what we mean by such talk. (2007, 288) 
I hope I have demonstrated herein by way of constructive counterexample that ‘higher and lower 
orders of necessity’ is by no means nonsense whatsoever, and furthermore such talk can be 
reconciled in a manner consistent with Ladyman and Ross’s claims.  More to the point: injecting 
some of Lange’s (2009) notions into the authors’ project of a metaphysics suitably naturalized 
(yet nevertheless supporting the framework of OSR suggesting a unified picture of science) can 
only render that picture more systematically complete, within a given domain of interest as 
demarcated by the particular science in question—whether fundamental physics or otherwise.  
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1
 As expressed by the criticism of leading non-realists like B. van Fraassen (1980-2008).  Following (Ladyman  
1998-2009) I use their term ‘non-realism’ to refer to the complement of scientific realism.  Indeed, van Fraasen’s 
empiricism is best characterized as such (as opposed to anti-realism) because of his ontological agnosticism and 
methodological neutrality. 
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2
 Some, but not all:  van Fraassen  ‘argues that epistemology ought to be indexical and anthropocentric, and that the 
distinction between observable and unobservable…[has no] direct ontological significance, but rather 
epistemological significance.’ (Ladyman and Ross 2007, p. 97) 
 
3
 Others include Johannes Kepler, Isaac Newton, Henri Poincare, Bertrand Russell, Ladyman (2009). 
 
4
 Namely, that Russell’s (1911) ESR collapses to a non-realist phenomenalism. 
 
5
 Latter-day adherents of the syntactic tradition are aware of the oversimplification at work here (many rudimentary 
theories in science contain mixed terms—the observation/theory distinction can be methodologically context-
sensitive in a number of ways).  Nevertheless, they claim that in principle a theory can be so analyzed.  ‘Toy 
examples’ come to mind—e.g., o1: ‘velocity of ball’, o2: ‘mass of ball’, t1: ‘kinetic energy of ball.’  Yet, even here, 
structuralists like (Sneed 1971) object: the observation/theory distinction is relative according to the set-theoretic 
predicates which formalizes the theory (i.e. , the θ-terms). 
 
6
 These seven are not mutually disjoint. 
7Benaceraff  (1965) also advocates such a position.   
8
 Ladyman (2009,  9) cites Mertz’s (1996) ‘network instance realism’ as an eschewing of ‘the tyranny of the 
monadic’ as such an example thereof. 
 
9
 An example of this position (jointly entailed by OSR-3 and OSR-4) is quantum holism.   
 
10
 In the phenomenological traditions, (macroscopic) objects are seen as heuristic devices by which agents can use to 
construct appropriate representations of the world and navigate therein. ‘[C]ognitive science may show that we are 
not able to think about certain domains without hypostasizing individuals as the bearers of structure.’ (15) 
 
11
 Critics are quick to issue their rebuttals, which I will discuss further in the sections below. 
 
12
 Including Quantum Gravity (167-175) and the Everett-Saunders-Wallace interpretation (175-183).  
 
13
 While OSR shares many methodological, epistemic, and ontic  points in common with Bas van Fraassen’s 
empiricism, (‘constructive’ (1980) or ‘structural’  (2006-7)) the central issue separating them is objective modality.  
‘van Fraassen…comes very close to our view.  The only difference between us is that we understand the relations in 
question to be nomological or more broadly modal, whereas he understands them to be extensional occurrent 
regularities. ..[S]ome scientific realists of a Humean inclination…argue that van Fraassen is right about this latter 
point. We…argue that the marriage of scientific realism and Humeanism about modality is an unhappy one.’ 
(Ladyman and Ross, 2007,  79, italics added)  
14
 Ladyman (2009),  Ladyman and Ross (2007) also examine objections to OSR—in particular Psillos’s (2001, 
2006) claim that since the dawn of 17th century modernism, substantival metaphysics was removed: so  there may be 
no principled way of distinguishing a theory’s empirical content from its structural content.  The authors’ skeptical 
rejoinder (2007, 157): 
 
Consider the claim that…forms, substances, and the likes was overthrown by the scientific revolution.  
How was the ‘nature’ of atoms understood?   Atoms were understood as individuals. Boltzmann 
incorporated such an understanding of the nature of atoms in terms of their individuality into…his 
mechanics…the…discussion of individuality with respect to entities in physics, and the metaphysics of 
relations makes it clear that standard scientific realism has been saddled with traditional metaphysics.  
 
15
 To wit: Individual substances (whether ‘matter’ or ‘infostuff’) comprising a compositional hierarchy putatively 
characterizing the world is a ‘forlorn’ activity, the authors submit: 
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When it comes to debates about the nature of matter in contemporary metaphysics it tends to be assumed 
that…: either there are atoms in the sense of partless particles, or there is ‘gunk’ [and by extension, 
‘infostuff’] in the sense of…infinitely divisible matter. This debate is essentially being conducted in the 
same terms as it was by the pre-Socratic philosophers…atomists were represented by Democritus and 
…‘gunkists’ by Anaxagoras…It is preposterous that in spite of the developments in the scientific 
understanding of matter that have occurred since then, contemporary metaphysicians blithely continue to 
suppose that the dichotomy between atoms and gunk remains relevant, and can be addressed a priori.  
Precisely what physics has taught us is that matter in the sense of extended stuff…has no counterpart in 
fundamental ontology. (20, italics added) 
 
16
 Reasonably precise criteria are posited to disambiguate and  bound the vagueness of notions like ‘scientific 
hypothesis’. (38) 
 
17
 ‘[O]ur verificationism, unlike that of the logical positivists, is not a claim about meaning. The statement ‘The Big 
Bang was caused by Elvis’ is perfectly meaningful in all reasonable senses…we call the statement ‘pointless’…it 
can make no contribution to objective inquiry.’ (30) 
 
18
 See Szabo-Gendler and Hawthorne (2002). 
 
19
 In particular, Chalmers (2002) examines in detail, using the tools of two-dimensional semantics, metaphysical 
possibility vis-à-vis  epistemic possibility (conceivability).   
 
20
 As they accuse Dennett of ‘waffl[ing] inconsistently between scale relativity of ontology and of epistemology.’ 
(200)  
 
21
 ‘Let us operationalize the concept of a special science…a science is special iff it aims at generalization such that 
measurements taken only from a restricted area of the universe, and/or at restricted scales are potential sources of 
confirmation and/or falsification of those generalizations.’ (195)  Moreover ‘since special sciences do seem 
generally to be about kinds of things and their causal powers…their metaphysical status [would be] mysterious’ 
were it not for an attempt to characterize them in term of real patterns. (193)  
  
22
 Three different positions claim that quantum information: a.) is a new physical entity Bub (2004), b.) is classical 
information stored in quantum systems Duwell (2003), c.) is just a subjective measure of degrees of belief Fuchs and 
Peres (2000). (184) 
 
23
 As I briefly mentioned above, the responses by Hawley (2010)  and Dorr (2010) certainly do well to call the 
reader’s attention to this hasty generalization.  However, to clarify, when it comes to the sin of ontological overreach 
committed by some in the field, Ladyman and Ross’s (2007,  20) complaints concerning the atomists and ‘gunkists’ 
(recall n. 15 above) seem well-justified in that particular case.  In essence, in the above passage and elsewhere the 
authors echo and extend van Fraassen’s concerns of the ‘inflationary metaphysics’ in standard scientific realism 
(1980, 73), whose claims indeed are frequently addressed (66-130).  However, while van Fraassen (1980-2002) 
targets scientific realism in a manner in which he adopts (in method) much of the standard tools of analytic 
metaphysics (e.g. set theory, modal logic, etc.), Ladyman and Ross’s (2007) criticisms are broad enough in scope to 
echo their suspicion of such very methods to begin with: 
 
[Analytic] metaphysicians usually…use logic and set theory to formulate their theories. From our 
perspective this does not confer any extra epistemic status on their activity, but it may bamboozle the 
outsider or the student into supposing that the activity has much in common with mathematics and science. 
(2007, n.14, 14)  
And even more tendentiously: 
We see no point in mincing words: it seems to us to be just ridiculous when philosophers look up from their 
desks and tell us while sitting there and concentrating they’ve discovered (usually all by themselves) facts 
about the nature of the world that compete with the fruits of ingenious experimentation conducted under 
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competitive pressure and organized by complex institutional processes.  The individual philosophers are 
not crazy; but quirks in the history and structure of the modern academy have encouraged crazy activity 
and hidden its absurdity. (2007, 57)  
As I aim to show in this section, certainly Lange’s project does not presume to ‘compete’ with the claims of 
fundamental or applied physics—only to systematically characterize such activity in the context of his analyses of 
nomological modality in the context of ‘[a] philosophical proposal [which] should be fruitful…by having welcome 
consequences that were not expressly built into it, yet follow…in a natural way.’ (2009, 91)  
24
 I adopt van Fraassen’s (2002) notion of ‘stance’ in contrast to ‘doctrine’. Borrowing from Husserl, a stance is ‘an 
orientation or attitude towards the world.’ (Ladyman and Ross 2007,  99).  Whereas a doctrine is a body of beliefs 
by which one assents to certain claims associated with them as being literally true.  Because an empiricist’s or 
naturalist’s body of beliefs is always subject to open-ended revision in the face of new evidence, van Fraassen 
argues that empiricism can never be affirmed as doctrine, lest one runs the risk of practicing philosophy in bad faith. 
‘A philosophical position can consist in…other than a belief [e.g., an instance of a doctrine] in what the world is 
like…A philosophical position can consist in a stance (attitude, commitment, approach…possibly including some 
propositional attitudes…as well)…[A] stance…cannot be simply equated with having beliefs or making assertions 
about what there is.’ (2002, p 47-48). The Husserlian (really Kantian-transcendental) aspect of the notion of stance 
is perhaps more strongly articulated by (MacKinnon 1972,  67): ‘If one accepts [some] systems of 
knowledge...as...relatively adequate expression[s], then one might ask what must the world be like if it can be 
known in the we do in fact [seem] to know it? This approach...is inadequate unless one considers not only the 
expression of knowledge through systems, but also the dynamics of knowing.’  A stance, as I understand it, would 
do just that—i.e., cast the light of understanding on the ‘dynamics of knowing.’   In any case, I bring up this 
methodological and epistemological distinction in passing here, to illustrate how naturalism (broadly conceived) can 
be approached in terms of a doctrine or as a stance—For instance, van Fraassen (1980) characterizes scientific 
realism as a stance concerning the primary aims of science. 
 
25
 To recall, an approach they claim which follows a methodological tradition evident in Sellars (1962) and Kitcher 
(1989) among others: ‘[W]e are interested here in a sense of ‘understanding’…better characterized by the term 
‘explanation’…[In contrast] a given metaphysic’s achievement of domestication furnishes no evidence at all that the 
metaphysics in question is true, and thus no reason for believing that it explains anything.’(1-2)   
26
 The de re / de dicto distinction can be characterized in terms of a scope ambiguity with respect to any modal 
operator Ξ.  Ab initio, at any rate, such a distinction can be read in terms of a narrow or broad scope interpretation 
for any modal operator Ξ applied in any modal statement ℘ involving the binding of its variables under Ξ.  
Consider, for example, the statement: 
℘ :  ‘It’s possible a (at least one) woman will win seat(s) in the upcoming election.’ 
In (first-order) modal logic, ℘ can take the form: ∃x: ◊ (Wx & Sx), where W and S
 
stand for predicates ‘woman,’ and 
‘will win seat(s) in the upcoming election.’  The above first-order formulation corresponds to a narrow interpretation 
of the scope of ◊ (de re), which  would make℘ equivalent to the claim that, loosely speaking, ‘there is at least one 
woman to whom it is attributable that (she/they) may win seats in the upcoming election. As the variable x is bound 
by the quantifier ∃ lying outside the scope of ◊, the sentence’s information content is directed primarily towards the 
object (in this case, one (or more) woma(/en)), hence de re.  On the other hand, a de dicto reading of ℘ above would 
be equivalent to the claim: ‘‘At least one woman will win seat(s) in the upcoming election’ is a possibility.’  In other 
words, ◊ is attributed to the whole claim, so can therefore be exchanged with the existential quantifier to yield the 
form:  ◊[∃x:(Wx&Sx)].  The sentence’s information content is directed primarily towards a statement (‘At least one 
woman…’), hence de dicto. 
27
 Insofar as facts of course correspond to an abstract, propositional structure.  Moreover ‘the universe’s state at a 
given moment cannot be purged of irreducibly subjunctive facts,’ (2009, xiv) insofar as, for example, instantaneous 
rates of change lend themselves to a naturally subjunctive interpretation: ‘[A] quantity’s instantaneous rate of 
change at time t traditionally plays various causal and explanatory roles…[and] [t]he best way to account for the 
causal and explanatory roles…is to interpret the rate in terms of some irreducibly subjunctive fact.’ (ibid)  To take 
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the homely example of velocity, for instance, according to Lange naturally connotes that the case  ‘were the body 
(existing at t) to remain in existence after t, the body’s trajectory would have a time-derivative at t equal to v’ (ibid.)  
Elsewhere Lange argues that subjunctive facts are what underwrite natural necessity—i.e. the distinctive kinds of 
nomological modality providing the structure of sets of laws (135-189).  ‘If such [subjunctive] facts must be 
countenanced as anyway, parsimony urges us to put them to work as lawmakers.’ (xiv)  
  
28
 So long as, to recall Section II above, one doesn’t adopt an ESR reading of such facts. Indeed, such a latter 
reading is automatically preempted in Lange, as all the counterfactuals utilized by Lange from the get-go, ‘involve 
aletheic modalities, not…epistemic modalit[ies].’ ( 2009, n. 24,  196) 
 
29
 See n. 27 above. 
 
30
 I.e. propositions without embedded  ‘it is a law that…’ operators.  I.e., ‘energy is conserved’ is a subnomic fact, 
whereas ‘It is a law that energy is conserved’ is not. 
 
31
 This is Lange’s shorthand for counterfactual conditionals: p → m should be read as: ‘Had p been the case, then 
m would have been the case.’  Elsewhere, Lange connects such counterfactual conditionals with subjunctive ‘might 
have’ statements: p ◊→ q is shorthand for ‘Had p been the case, then m might have been the case.’ In particular, see 
n. 24, 195-195:  The following entailment  is demonstrated ~ (p ◊→ ~q) ⇒ p → q.  However, Lange argues against 
the converse entailment, and thus denies an equivalence between ‘not-might-not have’ with ‘would have’ (as 
opposed to the ordinary, i.e. non-counterfactual, case in modal logic, i.e. ~◊~ ≡ ).  The principal reason why Lange 
denies the converse entailment has to do the with the Modality Principle (MP) discussed in 63-71, of which I will 
discuss in more detail below. 
 
32
 See n. 30, 31 above. 
 
33
 Combining several relatively intuitive examples that Lange discusses throughout certain particular sections (viz. 
§§I.6-I.9, 25-42) 
 
34
 The very existence of cases like Uranus of course provide the empirical support for such a consistency claim. 
 
35
 So irrelevant claims to test for lawhood in this example about the Earth’s axis may include propositions from 
fields in fundamental physics like quantum gravity, involving spatial separations at the Planck scale (~10-35 m), or 
propositions from deontic modal contexts, etc. ‘My purpose in offering this argument [for NP] is…to explain why it 
is not unprincipled to acknowledge context’s tremendous influence on what is preserved under a given 
counterfactual supposition, and yet to insist that in any context, the laws are preserved under any sub-nomic 
supposition logically consistent with them.’ (n. 34, 206) 
 
36
 I.e. from n. 31 above: Had p been the case, then m1 would have held. 
 
37
 Albeit, like conservation of energy, a meta-law (Lange 2009,  19) or a law governing other laws (not necessarily 
deterministically, to accommodate the statistical cases), the latter governing subnomic facts. For example, the latter 
case would be Newton’s second law applied to rotational systems, i.e. ΣτCM = dL/dt  i.e. the sum of all the torques 
experienced on a rigid body’s center of mass is equal to its time rate of change of its angular momentum, in which    
L ∝ Iω  (i.e. a rigid body’s angular momentum is proportional to the product of its rotational inertia and its angular 
velocity about its rotational axis—pace the Parallel Axis Theorem it is presupposed to go through the body’s center 
of mass.)  Now such first-order laws could have been expressed by different formulae, without affecting the 
conservation principles which are metalaws.  In addition, meta-metalaws (laws governing metalaws) would include 
examples symmetries like Einstein’s Equivalence Principles in general relativity or GR: any frame of reference 
undergoing uniform acceleration is locally equivalent to a frame of reference in free fall in a gravitational field.  
Laws governing meta-metalaws (meta-meta-metalaws) would include super-symmetry: For instance a boson (a 
particle consisting of integer spin number) is associated with fermion (a particle consisting of half-integer spin 
number) in a superpartner, i.e. a particle-pair whose constituents otherwise share the internal quantum number and 
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mass. Though no superpartners have yet to be observed, supersymmetry evinces some attractive mathematical 
results in Gauge theory, e.g. as when affixed as a local symmetry, Einstein’s GR is derived as a result.  
 
38
 Recall the example: Certainly ~m1, i.e. the Earth would not have seasons, is consistent with all the laws of 
classical mechanics, etc., in the above example.  But ~m2 (conservation of angular momentum is violated in this 
case) clearly isn’t. 
39
 Recall n. 31 above: The recursive would counterfactual conditionals entail not-might-not have… ones, as exhibited 
in SNS’s formulation. 
 
40
 Lange provides a proof in § I.8 (32-36). 
 
41
 Nevertheless in this discussion Lange is careful to point out that ‘[i]n this chapter, I am concerned only with 
identifying the special relation between laws and counterfactuals, not with figuring out why this relation holds.’ (31) 
 
42
 See § I.9, 37-42. 
 
43
 In the illustration Lange sets n = 3 as ‘broadly logical’ necessities (i.e. truths, since the context is aletheic, recall n. 
28 above) these would encompass: i.) narrowly logical necessities (e. g. either all Fs are Gs or some Fs are not Gs), 
ii.) Conceptual necessities (all brother are male), iii.) Mathematical necessities (there is no largest prime number), 
iv.) Moral necessity, i.e. ‘moral laws [which are] theorems of the correct moral theory…[hence] possess[ing] moral 
necessity.’ (n. 4, 207)  To wit, ‘broadly logical’ case iv.) contrasts with Lange’s admission of setting aside doxastic 
modalities (as he mentions in the next item) yet he does well to mention this species of modality in passing, as part 
of the genus of ‘broadly logical’ as just listing extensions of the latter term.  I qualify his claim here nevertheless 
with the inequality, since Level-3 also encompasses meta-metalaws (recall n. 37) which may involve exotic 
instances like supersymmetry. Whether or not supersymmetry is just an instance of iii.) is at best a controversial 
case—certainly despite the null results from super-colliders many high energy physicists are still on a quest to 
discover superpairs.  If so, one may balk at the presumption that all meta-metalaws are broadly logical necessities, 
hence suggesting that broadly logical necessities are at least Level-4—or else balk at the claim that super-symmetry 
is a bona fide Level 3 meta-metalaw (some physicists argue in favor of abandoning it). One might add in addition 
that since Lange focuses on aletheic and not epistemic modality (recall n. 27) the issue of aprioricity (are all broadly 
logical necessities a priori?) is not relevant. 
 
44
 A few examples here may be in order: strenuously obvious cases would include any contingent fact (Level – 0) p0 
like ‘Bob missed the bus’ once the indexical and truth-conditions (or ‘character’ and ‘content’, Kaplan 1989) are in 
place.  Certainly p0 ∈ {subnomic truths}, but is not a member of any level n (n ≥ 1) subnomically stable set.  The 
proposition p1: ‘Two charged bodies at rest experience a force proportional to the product of their charges and 
inversely proportional to the square of their distance measured by the spatial separation of the bodies’ centers of 
mass, in the direction along a line of action connecting their mass centers,’ i.e. Coulomb’s Law, is a case in which p1 
∈ Λ and since Λ is the largest non-maximal subonically stable set, then (as confirmed by intuition in this case) p1 is 
a subnomic truth or more precisely, noting the discussion above, Λ ⊂ {subnomic facts}, as proved by Lange        (§ 
I.9: 37-42) that subnomically stable sets form a chain, i.e. are totally ordered via set the inclusion relation ⊆.  Note  
that ⊆ is a partial ordering relation (i.e. is reflexive: for any set S: S ⊆ S, anti-symmetric: For any two sets S, T: S ⊆ 
T and T ⊆ S if and only if S = T, and transitive: For any sets R, S, T: if R ⊆ S and S ⊆ T, then R ⊆ T). Moreover, 
note that Lange’s proof rendering subnomic stability a total ordering is the demonstration that any two subnomically 
stable sets are comparable: i.e., given (subnomically stable) Σ, Γ: then either Σ ⊆ Γ or Γ ⊆ Σ. Thus, giving these 
précising claims, note further that p1 ∈ Λ - Λ(2) = {t| t ∈ Λ & t  ∉ Λ(2)} which is non-empty, i.e. p1 is exclusively a 
law governing a subnomic fact.  (Recall also (n. 30 above) that it p1’s facticity is formally secured by virtue of the 
absence of  the ‘It is a law that…’ operator).  Hence, an exclusively Level-2 subnomic fact would be p2: ‘Energy is 
conserved.’ i.e. p2 ∈ Λ(2) and p2 ∉ Λ(3) or belonging to the non-empty set  Λ(2) - Λ(3). An exclusively Level-3 (or 
higher?—Recall n. 43 above) would be any broadly logical claim p3—whether mathematical, narrowly logical, or 
otherwise.   
 
45
 One might privilege such relative necessities with (conversationally relevant) modifiers like ‘It was unavoidable 
that...’ Consider for instance the example discussed by Lange involving Luciano Pavarotti having laryngitis as 
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explaining why his failure to sing for the evening of his scheduled performance was an unavoidable fact.  That this 
necessity is relative is clear from the conversational context: ‘What suffices in the audience’s context to make 
Pavarotti’s failure to sing ‘unavoidable’ does not make it ‘unavoidable’ in the physician’s context.’ (2009, 61) 
Precisely stated: ‘The explanatory significance of a merely conversational modality is just as temporary as the 
context that brings it into salience.  [Whereas] [m]athematical and natural necessity…are explanatorily potent in any 
context.’ (61-62)  To be sure, however, this is just a first-pass means of setting apart ‘genuine necessity’ since au 
fond ‘if all necessities are merely relative to some or another set of conversationally relevant facts, then it seems 
arbitrary for us to regard p’s natural necessity as really making p inevitable but q’s ‘necessary’ relative to some other 
class of facts…’  In that regard, Lange’s MP acts as the regulative ‘filter’ (as NP filters out lawhood) for genuine 
necessity: MP’s ‘holding in both directions generalizes NP to all flavors of necessity…if the laws are exactly the 
natural necessities, and natural necessity must qualify as a variety of necessity in every context, then NP follows 
from MP’s holding in both directions.’ (66)  Again, ‘when a merely relative modality divides the facts into the 
necessities and the contingencies, either MP fails or the division turns out to be between the facts that we care about 
and those that we do not.’ (70)  In the latter case, recall n. 31 above concerning the context of relevance.  This can 
be stated negatively as ‘a genuine modality upholds MP without every relevant fact having to be necessary.’ (71)  
As Lange further illustrates, according to natural laws, a box of prunes he would be holding could not be shipped at 
superluminal speeds, for instance, and every relevant fact in this context need not be necessary for the claim to hold 
true: ‘Had the price [of prunes] been different or the weather in plum-growing regions been different, then the laws 
would still have held…MP exerts no pressure to expand the range of natural necessities to include facts about the 
price or the weather.’ (ibid.) 
 
46
 Recall n. 22 above, i.e. the associated ambiguity of its interpretation, at least by present-day schools of thought in 
the physics and philosophy of physics communities. 
 
47
 The notion is introduced by way of ‘locator functions’, which itself according to Ladyman and Ross is evidential 
of objective modality, insofar as ‘[o]bjective modalities in the material mode are represented by logical and 
mathematical modalities in the formal mode.’  (2007,  119) In particular, as ‘particular theoretical structures in the 
formal mode…represent particular intensional/modal relations among measurement results as “phenomena”, so long 
as it is understood that phenomena are not sense-data in the positivists’ sense,’ (ibid.) so the ostensive operation of 
picking out a real pattern is (in the ‘formal mode’) represented by the locator function, i.e. the ‘act of “tagging” 
against an established address system.’ (121). The dimensionality of such a locator function is characterized by the 
maximum number of parameters necessary to make the distinctions (of the real pattern in question being thus 
located) precise enough in the context of the particular investigation. (222)  Projectibility is then leant a more precise 
characterization in the formal mode, ‘as requiring a computation of the value of one or more measurable 
properties…in terms of dimensionality D [of the locator function], given input of a measurement taken by a physical 
computer M…[c]omputation [however] is necessary but not sufficient for projection.’ (223) In this regard, 
‘[p]rojectibility is a modal notion…just a better-than-chance estimability by a physically possible computer,’ where 
‘[e]stimability should be understood as estimability in the actual world that science aims to describe, not as 
estimability in some class of possible worlds.’ (224)  Real patterns are then characterized via projectibility in the 
sense that the following necessary and sufficient conditions hold: (i) the pattern ‘is projectible in at least one 
physically possible perspective,’ (226) and (ii.) such a pattern will encode information ‘about at least one structure 
of events or entities…where that encoding is more efficient, in information-theoretic terms, than [the pattern’s] bit-
map encoding…’ (226)      
